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 Suicide is a complex phenomenon. In the case of human beings, it raises thorny 
questions about life and death that perhaps no living being is in a position to answer. This 
may be why Camus (1955) once said: “there is only one really serious philosophical question, 
and that is suicide” (p. 3). Curiously, the concept of suicide seems to lose all its complexity 
when applied to nonhuman animals because so many people take it to be self-evident that 
nonhuman animals lack the emotional and cognitive wherewithal to commit what Shneidman 
(1985) calls “murder in the one hundred and eightieth degree.” For them, the concept of 
animal suicide can only be a joke, a category mistake, or an anthropomorphic illusion.1 They 
typically respond to the suggestion that some animals may engage in suicidal behavior by 
making suicide contingent on certain functions or capacities that only human beings are 
presumed to possess, such as self-reflective subjectivity, free will, or awareness of death. 
These appeals are inconclusive, however. They conflict with empirical research about the 
capacities of nonhuman animals and rely on problematic assumptions about the place of 
homo sapiens in the order of things.  
 
1.1. Reflexive Subjectivity  
One view is that suicide is possible only for animals endowed with a form of subjectivity that 
includes not only sentience, but also a specific kind of self-reflective subjectivity (henceforth 
“reflexivity”) whereby an animal is capable of grasping itself as an agent capable of action 
(i.e., as an “I”). Suicide, on this view, is a fundamentally reflexive act in which the agent is 
simultaneously subject and object. As such, it requires a level of subjective sophistication that 
animals simply do not have.2  
 This view suffers from two shortcomings. The first is conceptual as much as empirical: 
it assumes that reflexivity is an all-or-none dichotomy and that animals either have it or lack 
it absolutely. Yet we have no reason — at least not since Darwin put humans and animals on 
a natural continuum in On the Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871) — to 
expect such discontinuities in nature. In an article published in TRENDS in Ecology and 
Evolution in 2004, Bekoff and Sherman argue that natural diversity and biological evolution 
make it highly unlikely that there will ever be a single standard for typecasting animals into 
two simple classes: the have’s and the have not’s. There is no “acid-test for determining 
degrees of self-cognizance across all taxa” (p. 178). Following Darwin’s continuity thesis, 
Bekoff and Sherman maintain that animals have different types and degrees of subjective self-
awareness — types that cannot be reduced to “natural kinds,” and degrees that cannot be 
easily quantified. A great deal of empirical research supports this continuist paradigm 
(DeGrazia 1996; Baars 2005; Seth, Baars, and Edelman 2005; DeGrazia 2006; Feinberg and 
Mallatt 2013; Tononi and Koch 2015; Rowlands 2016). 3  This research challenges the 
conventional belief that self-cognizance sets humans (or even “big-brained creatures”) apart 
from the rest of nature (Bekoff and Sherman 2004, p. 179). 
                                                 
1 One example is Hooper (2010).  
2 Windt (1981) builds this requirement into his definition of suicide and argues that since nonhuman animals 
lack reflexive self-awareness, they cannot engage in suicide. Comai and Gobbi (2016) and Gould (2017) agree 
with the conclusion.  
3 The evidence for a continuist perspective is so strong that, according to Benvenuti (2016), it may soon require 
a wholesale reconfiguration of human-animal relations, beginning with a radical “rethinking of foundational 
concepts in law and health sciences” (p. 667). 
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Bekoff and Sherman (2004) highlight the diversity of animals on this continuum by 
identifying at least three different types of subjectivity that crisscross the animal kingdom in 
elaborate and nonlinear ways (see Table 1), suggesting that self-cognizance is a continuum 
that evolves constantly (and in multiple directions) rather than a dichotomy that magically 
carves nature at its joints: “The degree of self-cognizance of individuals in any species can be 
represented as a point on a continuum of complexity and conscious involvement” (p. 176). 
Like everything else in nature, self-cognizance is a matter of degree rather than kind.  
 
 
 Internal inconsistency is the second shortcoming of the view that only humans have 
reflexive subjectivity and hence only humans can commit suicide. Even if reflexivity were a 
natural dichotomy and a necessary condition for suicide, it still would not follow that the 
dichotomy maps neatly onto a species classification. Nor would it follow that only humans 
engage in suicide. There are humans whose suicidal behaviors have been documented but 
who may not meet the requirements of a theory of reflexive subjectivity, such as children 
(Stefanowski-Harding 1990; Matter and Matter 1984; Martin 2014; Heise, York, and Thatcher 
2016; Bodzy et al. 2016). There are also nonhumans that regularly pass self-recognition tests 
and, at least by this standard, meet the requirements of reflexivity. Great apes, dolphins, 
elephants, and the Eurasian magpie, for example, have all passed Gallup’s (1970) famous 
“mirror test,” which many animal behavior experts consider evidence of reflexive, self-
conscious subjectivity (Prior, Schwarz, and Güntürkün 2008), and which some human 
Table 1 – Types of Subjectivity  
Summary of Bekoff and Sherman (2004)* 
SELF-REFERENCING 
SUBJECTIVITY 
Distinguishing between animals 
that are members of one’s own 
species and those who are not. 
Entails “matching phenotypic 
characteristics of a target individual 
against the phenotype of the 
discriminator.” This type of subjectivity 
“can be reflexive and non-cognitive, 
even occurring in the immune system 
and in creatures without brains” (p. 
177). 
SELF-AWARE SUBJECTIVITY Distinguishing between self and 
other. 
Also referred to as “perceptual 
consciousness,” describes animals that 
understand, even if only tacitly, the 
boundaries of their own bodies and 
differentiate between self and other (“I” 
and “non-I”) (ibid.). 
SELF-CONSCIOUS 
SUBJECTIVITY 
Thinking about one’s behavior 
in relation to the actions of 
others. 
Also called “second-order thought” and 
“meta-cognition,” “leads to dynamic and 
finely graded behavioral outputs, 
ranging from cooperation to selfishness, 
depending on the costs and benefits of 
previous responses of conspecifics to 
the focal individual” (ibid.). Most 
common among animals who live in 
social structures with plastic 
hierarchies, such as primates. 
*These types are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive of the kinds of subjectivity that may exist in nature. They are only the most 
common types of subjective alignment we find among moderately and highly cognitively complex animals.  
Animal Sentience 2017.078:  Peña-Guzmán on Animal Suicide 
 4 
children fail up to the age of six (Willett 2014, p. 122).4 Hence, the argument that animals 
cannot commit suicide because they lack the right kind of subjectivity breaks down. To 
exclude all nonhumans from the domain of suicide, this argument would have to be construed 
quite stringently — in which case it would inevitably exclude some humans. Conversely, to 
effectively include all humans, it would have to be construed more liberally — in which case 
it would inevitably include some nonhumans.  
 
1.2. Free Will 
Some thinkers use the concept of free will as an argument against animal suicide, in part 
because this concept shapes our common-sense intuitions about suicide (Szasz 1986; 
Higonnet 1986; Hassana 1998; Douglas 2015).5 Inspired by a theological understanding of 
human beings as sites of transcendence, such thinkers hold that animals cannot commit 
suicide because suicide is an expression of free will, which only humans have. The problems 
with this line of reasoning are legion, but this section is limited to two for the sake of 
expediency: the problem of nonhuman free will and the problem of natural causality.6  
Do animals such as cows, pigs, parrots, dogs, and orangutans have free will? Although 
this is inconsistent with theological orthodoxy, it is possible to claim they do. Some cultures 
already claim this, 7  as do some experts on “voluntary behavior choice” and “positive 
reinforcement theory.” The latter hold that animals are not passive agents in the research 
process, but active participants who can choose whether to participate in research out of 
their own volition (Berns, Brooks, and Spivak 2012; Tan and Hare 2013; Fenton 2014).8 In a 
2012 article published in Biology & Philosophy, Fenton argues that some animals (he focuses 
on chimpanzees) have the ability to dissent from various kinds of interactions with humans 
and that, consequently, research protocols that do not take this morally salient capacity into 
account may fail “ethical standard[s] for morally acceptable research” (p. 89). The Japanese 
primatologist Tetsuro Matsuzawa agrees. After decades of working with chimpanzees, 
Matsuzawa came to the conclusion that chimpanzees act freely and voluntarily. They act, as 
he says explicitly, “based on their free will” (Matsuzawa, 2006, p. 20). Like Fenton, he also 
believes that behavioral and biomedical research must accommodate chimpanzees’ volitional 
and decisional capacities just as biomedical research involving human subjects must 
incorporate human beings’ ability to consent to, and dissent from, medical care (p. 16). 
 Now, one could avoid attributing free will to nonhuman animals by following Steward 
(2015), who strikes a shaky balance between theological commitments to human 
exceptionalism and the growing body of empirical evidence that animals, too, can act freely 
(or at least as freely as humans)9 by differentiating between what she calls “full-blown free 
will” and “capacities for voluntary action.” Only human beings have full-blown free will, she 
                                                 
4 The mirror test is not infallible. But its main flaw is that it can yield false negatives, not false positives (Bekoff 
and Sherman 2004, p. 177). 
5 References to “free will” appear frequently in suicide notes (Cheung, Merry, and Sundram 2015). 
6 Two other objections to free will are that free will does not exist (Wegner 2003; 2004; Ebert and Wegner 2011) 
and that it is an incoherent concept (Mackie 1955).  
7 Some cultures already do this. Maya-descendant communities in Mexico’s Yucatán peninsula view suicide as 
something that happens when an animal, human or nonhuman, loses its will to live (Braitman 2014, pp. 157-8).  
8 A number of animals, including rodents, can make informed decisions based on their own interests (Lahvis 
2017). 
9 Palmer (2010) expresses the view that animals have no free will, but neither do humans.  
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says, but many animals can act voluntarily. At first glance, this position seems reasonable 
enough, perfectly lodged between extremes. It satisfies theologians who emphatically assert 
that only humans have free will and natural scientists whose research indicates that animals 
are more than just Cartesian automata or Pavlovian black-boxes. Upon closer scrutiny, 
however, the position quickly proves unsustainable — indeed, unintelligible. As soon as we 
accept that animals have preferences, that they express and pursue these preferences in 
various contexts, that they plan ahead, that they sustain intentions for long periods of time, 
that they assent to and dissent from different situations, and that they make informed choices 
that are not pre-determined, it becomes quite difficult to see any meaningful difference 
between having full-blown free will and merely having the capacity to act freely. What 
empirically tractable difference does it make whether an animal has full-blown free will or 
only the capacity to act out of its own volition? Are there choices that an animal endowed 
with full-blown free will can make that an animal endowed with only voluntary-action 
capacities cannot? It does not appear so. This distinction then may be a textbook case of what 
William James (1995) once called “scholastic hair-splitting,” a reference to the medieval 
practice of making linguistic distinctions devoid of empirical traction. 
By definition, free will is a metaphysical concept. It denotes a force that is causally 
efficacious but that somehow stands outside the order of nature, that is, a force whose effects 
can be felt in the natural world but that is itself wholly unaffected by whatever happens in 
this world.10 As such, this concept has an anti-naturalistic air that may be incompatible with 
scientific epistemology in general and with contemporary understandings of suicide in 
particular. To define suicide in terms of free will is to place the phenomenon on a 
metaphysical pedestal just outside the reach of scientific practice and explanation — literally 
beyond (meta) nature (physis). Yet, it is not uncommon for scientists and laypeople to react 
to stories about suicidal animals (e.g., the case of the scorpion that stings itself when girted 
by fire or that of the rat that seeks out the smell of a cat and gets killed) by invoking this 
concept and asserting that these are not “true” suicides because they can be explained in 
terms of purely natural causes — for example, a simple reflex reaction in the case of the 
scorpion and the activity of the parasite Toxoplasma gondii in the case of the rat.11  Real 
suicides, they say, require an Augustinian “free choice of the will.” The assumption that 
underlies this belief is that if a self-induced death can be explained naturalistically (by 
physical, chemical, biological, or psychological processes), it cannot be called “suicide.” What 
shall we say, then, about self-induced human deaths that can also be explained in this 
manner?  
Consider the case of anti-depressant drugs. It is a well-known fact that the risk of 
suicide increases during antidepressant drug treatment involving selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). SSRIs, which are found in popular antidepressants like Prozac, 
Paxil, and Zoloft, affect the brain in such a way that patients who take them can experience 
                                                 
10  This is how philosophers and theologians from Hobbes and Descartes to Augustine and Aquinas have 
historically defined it — as liberum arbitrium. Proponents of free will often say an action cannot be “free” if it is 
determined by a cause external to the agent (“incompatabilism”) or by a cause external to the agent other than 
God (“theological compatibilism”). 
11 Preti (2011a) says “there is no evidence that parasite-induced behaviors are in any way comparable to the 
psychopathology leading to suicide in humans” (p. 819). However, Braitman (2014) observes that the same 
parasite that leads to suicidal acts in rats can also infect humans and lead them to engage in risky behaviors that 
we regularly deem suicidal (p. 180). 
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many of the emotional states typically associated with suicide (depression, mania, 
aggression, etc.).12 Now, imagine that a patient on SSRIs commits suicide. Assuming that the 
science about the link between SSRIs and suicide does not change,13 we would readily accept 
a purely naturalistic explanation of the suicide. We would say: “The cause of the patient’s 
death was the effect of SSRIs on her brain.” We would not say: “The cause was her God-given, 
transcendental power to act in ways not determined by any causes.”  
Perlin (1994) observes that the old medieval view of suicide as “sinful” has given way 
to a modern interpretation of it as “environmental.” Today, researchers look for the causal 
mechanisms involved in suicide; and they search for them in the domain of physical nature, 
not beyond it. No contemporary scientific theory explains suicide via the concept of free will. 
Neurological theories focus on the neurochemical processes concomitant with suicide. 
Psychological theories refer to the emotive and cognitive contents of the suicidal mind 
(thoughts, feelings, affects, tendencies). Sociological, epidemiological, and ecological theories 
focus on the social, environmental, and political factors that act upon individuals from 
without, such as poverty, homelessness, drug addiction, mental illness, features of the lived 
environment, patterns of social disorganization, and fractured systems of social signification 
(Jones 1982). Even though they disagree on many points, all these theories agree on one key 
point — namely, that the cause of suicide must be sought not in some metaphysical realm 
that is abstracted from the empirical world but in the empirical world itself. Durkheim (2002) 
made this point quite persuasively in his seminal 1897 study of suicide, where he rejected 
transcendental frameworks in favor of empirical ones (Douglas 2015). 14  More than one 
hundred years later, science continues to follow Durkheim’s lead. As of the writing of this 
article, no scientific theory of suicide incorporates free will into its explanatory space. Hence 
the question must be asked: If we no longer use the concept of free will to make sense of 
human suicide, why do we use it to make nonsense out of nonhuman suicide? 
 
1.3. Awareness of Death  
It is commonly said that to commit suicide an agent must intend to bring about its own death, 
which animals cannot do because they cannot “represent” or “conceptualize” death in the first 
place. But even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that animals lack a concept of death, 
it is still not clear why this should preclude them from engaging in suicide, especially when 
there are humans who engage in suicide but who may also lack this concept (e.g., children).15 
Moreover, it is not self-evident that animals do indeed lack this concept. Death plays a more 
central role in the lives of numerous animals than we have previously imagined. Burial rituals 
have been observed in various animal species, including crows (BBC News 2015), magpies 
(Bekoff 2009a), captive gorillas (Morin 2015), red foxes (Bekoff 2009b), elephants, and 
                                                 
12 The FDA requires a black-box warning informing consumers about the increased risk of suicidal ideation 
and behavior associated with SSRIs. 
13 In recent years, the link between SSRIs and suicide has been contested (McCain 2009), though not disproven. 
The point here is not about SSRIs per se, but about the incompatibility between free will and scientific 
understandings of causality.  
14 Durkheim’s (2002) theory, interestingly, excludes all considerations “related to the suicide of animals” (p. 
xliii). 
15 There are also humans who are circumstantially incapable of conceptualizing their own death, such as the 
criminal who is surrounded by police, panics, and commits “suicide by cop,” and the accident victim in extreme 
pain who refuses medical treatment, which Beauchamp and Childress (1978) insist on calling “suicide.” 
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dolphins (Goldman 2012). Furthermore, many animals — including pets likes cats and dogs 
and farm animals like horses, rabbits, and birds — experience feelings of bereavement, 
melancholia, and grief when relatives or companions die, which may mean survivors 
understand the difference between life and death (Angier 2008; King 2013; Bekoff 2009b). 
These feelings can be so acute that veterinarians recommend bereaved animals “be allowed 
to view the body of a recently deceased companion [… as] this may help with some sort of 
acceptance of the loss” (Wedderburn 2015, p. 1). Like their human counterparts, it seems, 
nonhuman animals need closure in the face of death; like us, they need to say good-bye. 
Walker, Waran, and Phillips’s (2016) recent study of owners’ perceptions of how their 
nonhuman companions respond to the death of another animal companion further supports 
this view. 
Research in the emerging field of “Pan thanatology,” which is the study of how 
members of the genus Pan relate to and process death, also shows that chimpanzees and 
bonobos have a grasp of death that goes beyond merely experiencing grief and sadness in the 
face of a loved one’s passing. Members of this genus have rituals surrounding death, including 
communal norms for the treatment of moribund conspecifics and their bodies postmortem. 
Bonobos, for example, often prevent the deceased bodies of friends and relatives from being 
moved or touched by outsiders, even if this means risking harm to themselves (NOVA 
2008),16 while chimpanzees treat sick and healthy conspecifics differently, just as they treat 
the bodies of the sick differently pre- and post-mortem (Anderson, Gillies, and Lock, 2010). 
Female chimpanzees have been filmed carrying the mummified remains of their infants on 
their backs for weeks or months after the infants have perished (Matsuzawa 1997; Biro et al. 
2010). This behavior, which arguably disproves Varki and Brower’s (2013) thesis that only 
humans can be “in denial” about death, has been documented in a wide range of mammals, 
including terrestrial mammals such as gorillas, baboons, macaques, lemurs, and geladas 
(Goldman 2012, p. 1), and marine mammals such as Indo-Pacific bottlenose dolphins, spinner 
dolphins, killer whales, Australian humpback dolphins, sperm whales, Risso’s dolphins, and 
short-finned pilot whales (Reggente et al. 2016).  
 
2. The Case for Animal Suicide  
 
The scientists who openly defend the possibility of animal suicide are a minority. This 
could be because of the eccentricity of the topic, but also because of how most scientists 
currently in the apogee of their careers were trained to think and write about animals in the 
1960s, ‘70s, ‘80s, ‘90s and early 2000s — namely, from a cool distance and with an air of 
skepticism, and without ever imputing emotions, feelings, or even mental states to animals 
for fear of sounding “anthropomorphic” (King 2013, p. 8; Bekoff 2007, p. xvii). Without 
realizing it, therefore, a good number of researchers may be self-selecting out of research 
topics that require discussing what Bekoff (2007) calls “the emotional lives of animals,” 
including suicide. Either way, what should surprise us is not that there aren’t more scientists 
who embrace the possibility of animal suicide openly, but that there are any who do. This 
suggests that there are scientifically sound reasons for believing that suicide may not be an 
exclusively human phenomenon.  
                                                 
16  Sichuan snub-nosed monkeys, though not members of the Pan genus, also provide “compassionate 
caregiving” to dying conspecifics with whom they share emotional bonds (Yang, Anderson, and Li 2016).  
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2.1. Negative Emotions and Psychopathologies  
Some researchers grant that some animals may have “the mental machinery to commit 
suicide” (Preti 2011b) because they can experience many of the emotional states typically 
connected with suicide (p. 2). A wide range of animals experience helplessness (Seligman 
1972; Malkesman et al. 2009), lethargy (Anderson, Gillies, and Lock 2010), and many 
conditions symptomatic of depression, such as chronic anxiety, aggressiveness, sleep 
problems, and anhedonia (Preti 2011a). Some even exhibit pathologies homologous to 
human psychiatric disorders that are recognized as antecedents to suicide, including post-
traumatic stress disorder, eating disorders, and anti-social, borderline, and schizoid 
personality disorders (Lilienfeld et al. 1999; O’Connor et al. 2001; Bradshaw 2005; Bruene et 
al. 2006).17 It is also revealing in this regard that we regularly diagnose animals using human 
psychological and psychiatric models18 and treat their mental disorders using drugs intended 
for human use. For example, it is not uncommon for domesticated and captive animals 
battling chronic anxiety and depression to be prescribed human antidepressants like Prozac, 
Xanax, and Paxil (Braitman 2014; Korte et al. 2007; Overall 2000), often with favorable 
outcomes (Crawley, Sutton, and Pickar 1985).  
 
2.2. Self-Destructive Behavior Parallels  
Nonhuman animals often engage in the same kinds of self-injurious and self-destructive 
behaviors that, in human beings, are described as “suicidal.” Crawley, Sutton, and Pickar 
(1985) provide a helpful compendium of evidence of self-destructive behaviors among 
nonhuman animals that are “relevant to self-destructive and suicidal behaviors in humans” 
(p. 300), based on which they conclude that “humans are not alone in exhibiting self-initiated 
behaviors that ultimately produce self-harm or death” (p. 308) (see Table 2). 
Admittedly, many of the behaviors listed by Crawley, Sutton, and Pickar (1985) have 
been explained by theories that make no reference to suicide. Evolutionary accounts of kin-
selection, for instance, successfully explain the altruistic behavior of hymenoptera, while 
ecological theories of population growth explain the dispersal behavior of lemmings. But 
there is a difference between how we explain the behavior and what we call it. Just as we 
explain the death of a patient on SSRIs by appealing to the effects of the drug and still call the 
death a “suicide,” we may explain many of these behaviors in a number of ways and also call 
them “suicidal.” Nonetheless, we may want to divide Crawley, Sutton, and Pickar’s (1985) 
evidence into “weak” and “strong.” Weak evidence would include general behavioral parallels 
between humans and nonhumans that are not suicide-specific, whereas strong evidence 
would include biological, chemical, neurological, and psychological parallels with a more 
direct link to suicide. Gould et al. (2017) recently described many of these parallels in detail, 
plus some additional ones not mentioned in Crawley, Sutton, and Pickar (1985), such as 
“neurotransmitter system abnormalities, endocrine and neuroimmune changes, […] 
                                                 
17 Table 2 in Preti (2011) offers a helpful list of all the negative emotions associated with suicide that afflict 
animals. 
18 One example of this is the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM) developed by Patrick, Fowles, and Krueger 
(2009), and Patrick (2010). Originally intended for human applications and relying heavily on linguistic reports 
from patients, this metric is already being used with nonhuman animals for diagnostic purposes (Brüne 2006, 
p. 1251). Recently, Latzman et al. (2016) created a psychopathy measure called “Chimpanzee Triarchic” (CHMP-
Tri) that is modeled after TriPM and is designed to investigate psychopathic personality in chimpanzees. 
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decision-making deficits, as well as the role of critical interactions between genetic and 
epigenetic factors” (Gould et al. 2017, p. 1).  
 
  
Consider, as a candidate for strong evidence, the self-destructive behaviors of 
cetaceans and, more specifically, the controversial topic of dolphin suicide. In the Academy-
Award-winning documentary The Cove (2009), dolphin trainer and animal rights activist 
Richard O’Barry claims to have observed a dolphin named Kathy kill herself by willingly 
choosing not to breath. According to O’Barry, Kathy, who appeared in the popular 1960s 
show Flipper, was severely depressed after living her entire life in captivity. At some point, 
he says, she probably lost her will to live and killed herself: “These are self-aware creatures 
with a brain larger than a human brain. If life becomes so unbearable, they just don't take the 
next breath. It's suicide” (Nobel 2010, p. 1).  
To skeptical ears, this story reeks of anthropomorphism. It seems to project onto a 
dolphin a range of mental and motivational states that presumably only humans experience. 
Yet, according to Naomi Rose, a world-renowned expert on orca behavior and a member of 
the International Whaling Commission’s Scientific Committee, O’Barry’s suggestion is not as 
implausible as some might think (Braitman 2014, p. 167). She is not alone in this view. Marino 
(2016), an expert in dolphin cognition whose research first showed that some dolphins pass 
Gallup’s mirror test, agrees with her. In a white paper on dolphin suicide, Marino claims, “the 
behavioral, cognitive, neurological and physiological evidence suggests it is possible that 
dolphins possess the ability to end their own lives” (p. 1). She gives three reasons for this 
view.  
Table 2 – Self-Destructive Behaviors 
Summary of Crawley, Sutton, and Pickar (1985) 













Animals can develop conditions 
homologous to depression, 




The same biological, 
physiological, and neurological 
factors implicated in human 
suicide are also implicated in 
cases of self-destructive 
behavior in nonhumans. b 
Ethological 
Observation 
Field research on 
nonhuman behaviors 
that resemble 




When an animal sacrifices itself 
for others. c 
DISPERSAL BEHAVIORS 
Generated by pressures in 
population density that result 
in the “expulsion of an 
individual from the group.” d 
STRESS-RELATED 
BEHAVIORS 
Involving captive animals, 
resulting in self-harm e 
a e.g., experiments on “learned helplessness” in rodents and “social separation” in primates 
b e.g., “resistance to the dexamethasone suppression of cortisol,” “low cerebrospinal fluid 5-HIAA,” and “disturbances in the link 
between serotonergic systems and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis” (pp. 305-7) 
c e.g., the “soldering” behavior of hymenoptera, the “herding” behavior of cattle and fish, and the alarm calls and “kamikaze” defense 
mechanisms of blackbirds, warblers, jays, robins, and hummingbirds (pp. 301-2) 
d commonly observed in arctic ground squirrels, rats, mice, and lemmings (pp. 302-3) 
e self-aggression, self-fighting, self-biting, self-mutilation, and self-endangerment (via refusal to eat) (p. 303) 
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First, dolphins are extraordinarily intelligent mammals capable of self-awareness and 
metacognition. They recognize themselves in a mirror (Reiss and Marino 2001), 
“demonstrate awareness of their own bodies in a variety of other ways” (Mercado et al. 1998, 
1999), and display high-level social cognition (Marino 2016, pp. 1-2). Second, dolphins have 
large, complex brains: “The dolphin neocortex (the evolutionarily newest part of the brain 
involved in higher-order thinking) is massive and even more convoluted than that of 
humans.” Also, the dolphin limbic system, a series of neural structures and circuits that 
control long-term memory and emotion, “is particularly elaborated,” which suggests dolphins 
“possess a sophisticated capacity for emotion and the kinds of thinking processes that would 
be involved in complex motivational states, such as those that accompany thoughts of 
suicide” (ibid., p. 2). And third, the nature of dolphin respiration provides a viable mechanism 
for the execution of suicide. Unlike humans, dolphins are voluntary breathers. Each breath 
they take reflects a conscious decision they make. “They do not have the involuntary 
inhalation response that causes humans and other land animals to breathe in water and 
drown. Instead, dolphins can hold their breath indefinitely until they die from hypoxia. This 
provides a physiological mechanism that would make the voluntary cessation of breathing a 
realistic possibility” (ibid.).19 Marino concludes that dolphins may be capable of intending 
and completing suicide. She adds, however, that “[t]his conclusion is tentative because it is 
difficult to confirm subjective states in other beings and, in particular, those who do not share 
our language” (ibid.). Even if we doubt O’Barry’s particular story, the evidence suggests that 
the capacity for suicide “may exist in dolphins” (ibid.). King (2013) echoes this claim, arguing 
that the hypothesis of dolphin suicide cannot be ruled out even when military sonar 
technology is proven to play a role in the self-inflicted death of a dolphin (p. 122). [See also 
King 2016 and accompanying commentaries, this journal. – ed.] 
In general, the evidence for self-injurious and self-destructive behavior in animals is 
significant. In a 2007 report, Preti reviewed all the research on the subject of animal suicide 
published between 1967 and 2007 in the Medline/PubMed and PsychINFO databases to find 
out whether the available evidence supported the belief that animals engage in suicidal 
behavior. His comprehensive review yielded ample evidence for this belief. Many animals, 
especially captive and isolated ones, engage in self-destructive behaviors that run the full 
gamut from self-mutilation to self-cannibalism (p. 834). Some of the species mentioned in 
Preti’s report include rhesus monkeys, rabbits, rats, psittacine birds, and octopi, although the 
list is not exhaustive. Elsewhere, Preti builds on this by indicating that many animals starve 
themselves to death voluntarily if captured or separated from loved ones, whereas others 
self-destroy while in the throes of psychopathology. Still others simply lose interest in 
species-typical, life-enhancing activities if they find themselves in suboptimal living 
conditions, especially those “perceived as uncontrollable” (Preti 2011a, p. 819). Preti (2007) 
ends on a note similar to Marino’s: while existing evidence does not prove animals commit 
suicide, it demonstrates that this possibility cannot be “rejected a priori” (p. 843).  
 
2.3. The Dilemma of Model Fidelity in Suicide Research  
Models are conceptual representations that help scientists explain and predict natural 
phenomena. With them, scientists give accounts of the causal mechanisms involved in 
                                                 
19 Rose accepts other mechanisms of dolphin suicide, including refusal to eat and refusal to engage with others, 
both of which bring about a slow death (Braitman 2014, p. 168). 
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different kinds of phenomena and make estimations about the future behavior of natural 
systems. Models facilitate what philosophers of science call “surrogate reasoning,” which is 
an epistemic maneuver whereby one makes inferences about a target system by observing 
the behavior of a model, making predictions about its future behavior and extrapolating from 
model to target. In the philosophy of science literature, models that capture enough of the 
causal relationships of a target system to help scientists make reliable inferences about its 
behavior are said to be “of a high order of fidelity.” Models that fail to expedite scientific 
explanation and prediction, by contrast, are considered “of a low order of fidelity.” 
While animal models are ethically controversial (DeGrazia 2016; DeGrazia and Sebo 
2015; Conlee 2012), they are used regularly in human suicide research,20 where they are 
viewed as “formidable tools to investigate the etiology of an illness, its course, and potential 
treatment” (Preti 2011a, p. 818). Most suicide researchers believe, explicitly or implicitly, 
that there is a clear and testable link between animal models and their target systems and 
that, as a consequence, the former are of a high order of fidelity (Lipsaka 2000) — otherwise 
they would not use these models in their research, let alone treat them as reliable 
springboards for surrogate reasoning (Preti 2011a, p. 818). In effect, faith in the validity of 
animal models is so strong in this field that researchers often praise them as being triply valid, 
which is to say, as being valid in three senses: (1) in the sense of having a high degree of 
“correspondence” or “similitude” with their target mechanism (“face validity”), (2) in the 
sense of inducing behavioral changes in animals “that can be monitored and reversed by the 
same treatment modalities that are effective in humans” (“predictive validity”), and (3) in the 
sense of capturing causally significant biological, chemical, and neurological pathways in 
animals comparable to those operative in human biology and behavior (“etiological validity”) 
(ibid.).  
I take no stance here on whether animal models are of a high or a low order of fidelity 
relative to their target systems in suicide research. I do, however, claim that scientists’ 
commitment to their use has implications for animal suicide. Currently, researchers use 
animal models to study the emotional states that are viewed as antecedents to suicide, the 
self-destructive behaviors of human beings, and the “biological intermediaries” that in 
humans lead from emotional antecedent to behavioral effect (say, from psychopathology to 
self-destruction). This implies that animals can experience some of the emotions and 
psychopathologies that lead to suicide in human beings (Malkesman et al. 2009, p. 165), that 
animals can engage in the sorts of behaviors that in human beings are labeled “suicidal,” and 
that the intermediary processes are similar in humans and animals (or, at least, similar 
enough to permit surrogate reasoning in suicide research) (Crawley, Sutton, and Pickar 1985; 
Preti 2011a). Our best research practices, then, commit us to the view that nonhuman 
animals (i) experience the emotional and psychological conditions that, in human beings, 
cause suicide; (ii) display behaviors that, in human beings, are exemplary of suicide; and (iii) 
undergo the same biochemical and biological process on the road from (i) to (ii). On what 
basis then do we cling to the view that it would be impossible for an animal to commit suicide 
or engage in suicidal behavior? 
                                                 
20  Animals are used in pharmacological studies of intra-cranial self-stimulation, in sensory manipulation 
experiments that explore the links between serotonin and noradrenaline and between corticosteroids and 
stress (e.g., olfactory bulbectomy tests), in behavioral experiments on hopelessness, fatigue, and chronic stress 
(e.g., forced swimming tests), and in social-stress tests involving “disrupted parenting” and “disrupted social 
hierarchies” (e.g., social isolation tests). See Preti (2011). 
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Perhaps the answer is that an interpretative bias has permeated the fields of animal 
and suicide research: the bias of humanism. From an early age, we are taught that human 
beings stand over and above all other animals by virtue of possessing a special “something” 
(reason, language, subjectivity, free will, awareness of death, or something else) that gives us 
an exceptional and inimitable moral status. This belief affects how we think and talk about 
animals, not to mention how we treat them. It may also affect how we interpret data about 
the richness and complexity of their cognitive, behavioral, and social lives. In may cause us, 
for example, to apply atypical standards of evidence in some settings but not others and to 
dismiss from the outset hypotheses that we are already psychologically predisposed to doubt 
or reject (Leavens, Bard, and Hopkins 2017; Willett 2014; Burghardt 2016). One could argue 
that in the case of the animal sciences, this bias manifests itself primarily as an anti-
confirmation bias that inclines us to be hyper-skeptical of ideas that challenge our belief in 
our presumed uniqueness and superiority. In our minds, such ideas never get confirmed — 
no matter how much support they might have. 
This bias puts suicide researchers in a double bind since they must take a position on 
whether the link between negative emotions and self-destructive behaviors exists in both 
humans and nonhuman animals. If they accept the link, they safeguard the validity of animal 
models in suicide research but undermine the ideology of human exceptionalism that posits 
a break between humans and animals. If they reject it, they safeguard the ideology of human 
exceptionalism but call into question the legitimacy of animal-based suicide research itself. 
Either way, something must give. If animals can self-destruct because of negative emotions 
and psychopathologies, we may be (epistemologically, not necessarily ethically) justified in 
using them as models for human suicide. But then we cannot rule out the possibility that they, 
too, commit suicide. If, by contrast, they cannot, we may rule out the possibility of animal 
suicide, but we must end our use of animal models since they cannot “advance our knowledge 
regarding suicide” (Rezaeian 2012, p. 17). Our belief that animals cannot engage in suicidal 
behavior and our belief that animal-based research can illuminate “every single step leading 
to suicide in humans” (Preti 2011a, p. 821) may be incompatible.  
 
3. The Animal Suicide Hypothesis: A Continuist Approach  
  
 Thinking about self-destructive behaviors as points on a spectrum that includes 
humans and animals opens the door to a new way of thinking about suicide that foregrounds 
suicidal behavior. On this view, which we may call “the continuist view,” suicidal behavior is 
a natural spectrum that encompasses a wide range of animal activities that are (i) self-
directed and that (ii) result in serious injury to the animal or in the termination of its life-
activity either suddenly or over an extended period of time. At one end of this spectrum, we 
find some of the most sophisticated acts of self-annihilation of cognitively complex animals, 
humans included; at the other end, we find more basic forms of self-injury and self-
destruction, such as the self-sting of the scorpion. Strewn between these extremes, we find a 
plethora of “middle cases” that are related to one another by degree. This view treats self-
destructive behaviors as expressions of what Goldney (1980) calls “conservation-
withdrawal,” which is the complex and multiply-realizable process whereby an animal de-
activates or negates its normal life-conserving activities.  
 Two dimensions of this theory require elaboration. First, notice that this theory 
admits no radical gap between the human and the nonhuman. It rejects the popular notion 
Animal Sentience 2017.078:  Peña-Guzmán on Animal Suicide 
 13 
that “something” makes us, homo sapiens, biologically unique. Importantly, this does not rule 
out meaningful differences between different types of suicidal behaviors or between the 
kinds of suicidal behaviors that are possible for different species. Just as Darwin’s insight that 
humans and animals exist on an evolutionary continuum has not kept natural scientists from 
successfully telling a human apart from a rhesus monkey, nothing internal to the continuist 
paradigm requires that we view all suicidal behaviors as “the same.” All the continuist view 
holds is that there is no “something” that makes suicidal behavior a possibility only for 
humans. Suicidal behavior is multiply realizable, and this means that it can be effectuated by 
different causal pathways and can take radically different forms that will likely vary 
depending on a number of factors, such as the evolutionary lineages of different species, the 
developmental histories of different animals, the means of self-destruction at their disposal, 
the presence or absence of different psychopathologies, and so on.  
   Second, and more controversially, the continuist theory does away with the classical 
notion that intent always precedes behavior and must be a component of all suicide-
explanations. Many commentators will no doubt look askance at a theory of suicide that 
relinquishes the concept of intent since “it is a near-universal premise in contemporary 
cognitive sciences that mental states cause behavior” (Leavens, Bard, and Hopkins 2017, p. 
6). Yet there are good reasons to be suspicious of this “near-universal” belief, which is already 
losing ground in the animal sciences in light of recent work on animal cognition that explains 
animal behavior without recourse to mental states, including intentions.  
Consider Leavens et al.’s (2017) recent work on ape social cognition and 
communication. Many primatologists have claimed that apes do not engage in declarative or 
expressive gestures (such as pointing) because they cannot conjure up the requisite mental 
states to do so — that is, because they cannot intend the right thing in the right way. This 
view, which has shaped virtually all research on ape cognition since at least the 1970s, relies 
“on the core assumption that intentional and epistemic states cause overt behavior” (Leavens 
et al. 2017, p. 6). In the absence of epistemic states, behavior cannot materialize.  
Leavens et al., however, attack this view from three different angles. First, they point 
out that this “core assumption” is unnecessary, as there are plenty of models of behavior that 
do not hypostatize mental states (beliefs, intentions, desires) as causes of expressed 
behavior. In the study of human behavior, such models include “theoretical positions 
grounded in distributed or embodied cognitive perspectives […] and also some recent 
extensions of behaviorism” (ibid.). 21  In the study of animal behavior, this includes 
experimental approaches based on “cross-fostering,” “radical operationalization,” “training,” 
and “sampling,” all of which the authors advocate (ibid. pp. 5-12).  
Leavens et al. also point out that the hypothesis that mental states cause behavior is 
empirically bankrupt. Although we are accustomed to thinking that mental states cause 
behavior, “it is, in practice, impossible to assign a truth value to the presence or absence of 
any hypothetical mental state” (ibid. p. 7). At present, there is no scientific procedure — no 
fMRI, no questionnaire, no surgical intervention — that can detect the presence or absence 
of a mental state in a person, let alone track or measure it in a scientifically meaningful way. 
“This may not be immediately obvious to some readers,” they write, but appealing to mental 
                                                 
21 Examples of the embodied-cognition approach include Barrett (2011); Chemero (2011); Johnson (2001); 
Sehon (2000); and Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991): examples of the neo-behaviorist approach include 
Rachlin (1992) and Baum (2002). Both approaches explain behavior without appealing to intentions.  
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states in scientific articles is, technically, no different from appealing to “demons, or angels, 
or spirits, or what have you” (pp. 10-11). Like “angels” and “demons,” “mental states” are 
“structurally unfalsifiable” and consequently empirically meaningless (ibid.; Popper 2005). 
The mental model of behavior, therefore, cannot demonstrate the presence or absence of 
intentions “in any species, including humans,” or even prove that behavior is causally 
dependent upon mental states (ibid.). It merely posits as objectively real a set of causes 
(mental states) that no scientific procedure can either confirm or falsify.  
Leavens et al. round off their appraisal of the mental model of behavior by presenting 
empirical evidence that apes do engage in gestural behaviors similar to those of human 
children. Of course, we cannot access the ape mind to see whether these creatures intend to 
share information about the location of an object when they index it, but the point is that we 
needn’t because appeals to intentions are not necessary for the scientific explanation of 
behavior and may, in fact, undermine it. The authors concede that none of the alternative 
approaches they discuss — such as alternatives rooted in embodied cognition or neo-
behaviorism — will ever “reveal hypothetical psychological causal factors,” but this 
incapacity is already inherent “in all contemporary approaches to comparative and 
developmental social cognition” since such factors are necessarily inaccessible to empirical 
researchers (ibid., p. 13). Given the logical and empirical inadequacies of the mental model, 
they conclude, we should move “beyond unfalsifiable psychologies of communication” (ibid., 
p. 11); and the first step in that direction is to stop explaining behavior via intent. 
We should apply Leavens et al.’s critique of the use of mental states in discussions of 
social cognition to contemporary discussions of suicide because there are real cases in which 
intent appears either at the same time as (in actu) or even after (ex-post facto) the behavior 
it supposedly causes,22 and suicide may be among them. Durkheim (2002) argues that intent 
is not a necessary condition for human suicide.23 Meanwhile, Jones (1982) invites us to view 
suicide as a complex chain of events in which suicidal behavior comes first and suicidal intent 
second. For him, the intent to die, if it forms at all, often forms after the process of 
conservation-withdrawal has begun. Contemporary theories of suicide that latch onto the 
concept of intent may therefore inadvertently limit their own explanatory scope and 
theoretical appeal by universalizing a framework that is already suspect in the cognitive and 
animal sciences and whose organizing principle may be a serious conceptual liability.  
The scientific study of suicide is likely to benefit from capitalizing on the image of 
suicide as a continuum of conservation-withdrawal behaviors. This image fits better with the 
latest empirical findings about the behavioral and cognitive abilities of many animals and 
does not render the entire field of human suicide research epistemologically suspect by 
                                                 
22 Apart from the theories mentioned by Leavens, Bard, and Hopkins (2017), there are many others that do not 
require intent to precede behavior. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodied cognition holds that 
motivation need not precede action because intent is often constructed in actu (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 19; 
Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 505). Searle’s (1983) theory of mind also uses the concept of “intention-in-action” to 
capture actions that are contemporaneous with the intent that presumably “explains” them. Libet’s (1999) 
psychological experiments on volitional acts and unconscious motivation suggest that actions may initiate 
before one becomes aware of them and thus before one can properly intend them (Libet et al. 1999). Rowlands 
(2006) has developed an account of the normativity of action that deflates the role of mental representation and 
intentionality.  
23 Durkheim (2002) argues that not all suicides involve the conscious intent to die (e.g., soldiers who sacrifice 
themselves for their regiment, martyrs who die for their faith, and mothers who sacrifice themselves for their 
child). With or without intent, he says, all suicides remain “varieties of a single class” (p. xli). 
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mystifying the “cross-species parallels” it presupposes (Malkesman et al. 2009). Moreover, it 
is tidier and neater as an explanatory framework than its anthropocentric counterpart. 
Depending on how it is formulated, the anthropocentric theory that only humans commit 
suicide fails to explain various human suicides. When it requires reflexive subjectivity, it fails 
to explain the suicides of humans who may not meet certain criteria of self-cognizance, such 
as children and individuals with severe cognitive disabilities. When it requires free will, it 
fails to explain human suicides triggered by empirically tractable natural causes (such as anti-
depressants). When it requires awareness of death, it once again runs into the problem of 
children and the severely cognitively disabled who, at least on some interpretations, may not 
understand their own mortality or that of others. 24  Finally, when it requires intent, the 
anthropocentric theory faces the empirical problem that intent is unfalsifiable, the causal 
problem that it may not precede behavior, and the epistemological problem that (even if it 
exists and precedes behavior) it may be impossible to ascertain, especially postmortem.25 
Continuism remedies these weaknesses.  
 
4. Epistemic Humility  
 
 “Epistemic humility” refers to an attitude of openness and modesty relative to one’s 
own beliefs. 26  Especially under conditions of uncertainty, epistemic humility can be a 
scholarly virtue of sorts. To be humble in an epistemic sense means to be candid about the 
limits of scientific knowledge — to recognize the gaps, rifts, and lacunae that often inhere in 
even our most powerful theories (and to calibrate our beliefs about the world accordingly). 
It means remaining open to possibilities that are consistent with the observational and 
theoretical scaffolding of a science even if they cut against the grain of received wisdom or 
personal conviction. To be epistemically humble is to be modest about the strength and reach 
of our ways of seeing and interpreting the world. Applied to animal suicide, epistemic 
humility requires taking seriously the empirical evidence that challenges our preconceived 
ideas about the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral capabilities of nonhuman animals, and 
facing up to the empirical and conceptual shortcomings of the anthropocentric theory of 
suicide.  
Some experts on animal behavior already embrace a continuist interpretation of 
suicide (Crawley, Sutton, and Pickar 1985, p. 308; Braitman 2014, p. 210). Still, opponents 
often rebuff them by pointing out that we have not yet created a successful animal model of 
suicide (Comai and Gobbi 2016; Hooper 2010). This, they argue, proves that animals are 
incapable of suicidal behavior. As Comai and Gobbi (2016) put it: “there are no animal models 
of suicide mainly because there is no instance of suicide among animals” (p. 177). But aside 
from begging the question, this argument ignores numerous alternative explanations for the 
nonexistence of these models (see Table 3). Whereas it is true that animal suicide has not yet 
                                                 
24 McEvoy, Reid, and Guerin (2002); and McEvoy, MacHale, and Tierney (2012), reject this view. 
25 Already in the nineteenth century, the Italian psychiatrist Enrico Morselli hypothesized that many suicidal 
agents may be unaware of why they killed themselves. The reason for their suicide eludes them (Ramsden and 
Wilson 2014). Durkheim (2002) echoed this view: “Intent is too intimate a thing to be more than approximately 
interpreted by another. It even escapes self-observation. How often we mistake the true reasons for our acts! 
We constantly explain acts due to petty feelings or blind routine by generous passions or lofty considerations” 
(p. xli).  
26 I borrow the concept of epistemic humility from Schwab (2012), who advocates its use in medicine.  
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been modeled in a laboratory, epistemic humility dictates that it cannot be ruled out 
altogether on the basis of current knowledge. 
 
 
There are epistemological and ethical reasons to adopt an attitude of epistemic 
humility in debates about animal suicide. Epistemologically, this attitude helps us avoid rash 
conclusions about animals that may clash with the empirical findings of the cognitive and 
behavioral sciences. Ethically, it is the least likely to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the 
harming of animals. Willett (2014) holds that scientific judgments about what animals can 
and cannot do often motivate non-scientific judgments about what humans can and cannot 
do to them. The less we think animals are capable of, the more we rationalize 
“intrumentalizing” them and causing them harm for human benefit (in laboratories, factories, 
farms, etc.). Judgments about animal suicide, then, are not only scientific; they are ethical, too. 
And from an ethical standpoint, an attitude of epistemic humility is preferable because it best 
satisfies what philosophers call the “minimax principle” of rationality, which holds that when 
choosing between two options, one should choose the one most likely to yield the best worst-
case scenario.  
If animals can commit suicide and the animal suicide hypothesis is correct, epistemic 
humility helps us avoid (a) the epistemic loss of making false inferences about nonhuman 
animals and (b) the ethical risk that those inferences will be used to justify the unethical 
treatment of animals. But if animals really are incapable of committing suicide and the animal 
suicide hypothesis is wrong, epistemic humility incurs (a) no ethical costs and (b) only the 
negligible epistemic cost of having delayed the acceptance of this correct inference. Ethical 
Table 3 — Plausible Explanations for the Nonexistence of Animal Suicide Models  
PRACTICAL OBSTACLES IN RESEARCH 
Animals that are arguably the best candidates 
for modeling suicide (e.g., chimpanzees and 
dolphins) are difficult to access and manage. 
Those that can be easily accessed and 
managed (e.g., mice and rats) may be inferior 
models of suicide. a 
LACK OF LETHAL MEANS 
Animals may “have fewer tools available to 
them to inflict mortal wounds.” b 
LACK OF COGNITIVE MEANS 
Animals may “lack humanity’s sophisticated 
cognitive abilities with which to plan their 
own ends.” c 
LIMITS OF HUMAN PERCEPTION 
Animal suicides may be invisible to human 
researchers “because they resemble other 
modes of death.” d 
INCOMPLETENESS OF DATA 
Ethological and laboratory data may be 
incomplete due to an overall lack of research 
on animal sentience, emotion, and cognition e 
or to the confounded design of animal 
research protocols. f  
INTERPRETATIVE BIAS 
Excessive fear of anthropomorphizing animals 
may lead scientists to overlook potentially 
meaningful data and avoid inferences that cut 
against the grain of expectation.    
a Preti 2011a, p. 821; b Preti (2011a) claims, “the availability of lethal means in a key factor in suicide” (p. 824). Interestingly, 
differences in access to lethal means are often used explain gendered differences in “suicidal success” among human beings (Rich et 
al. 1988); c Braitman 2014, p. 210; d deCaranzaro 1981, p. 154; e deCaranzaro 1981, p. 154; f Leavens, Bard, and Hopkins (2017). 
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cost-benefit analysis tips the balance in favor of the continuist view. [Cf. Birch’s (2017) target 




The hypothesis of animal suicide upsets our cultural beliefs about animals and, if true, 
may have significant practical and ethical implications. In their work on chimpanzee 
mourning, for instance, Anderson, Gillies, and Lock (2010), argue that if we accept that 
chimpanzees have a concept of death, we may incur a number of ethical responsibilities 
toward them that should affect how we treat and manage them in zoos, sanctuaries, and 
laboratories.27 For them, the scientific debate on whether chimpanzees have a concept of 
death has implications beyond science.  
 A similar argument may be made about suicide. If we grant that animals engage in 
suicidal behavior, a number of things may follow. Perhaps it follows that veterinarians should 
be better trained in the diagnosis and management of suicidal behaviors in animals. Perhaps 
it follows that animal researchers should invest more time and energy into studying how 
suicidal behavior manifests in different species and under different environmental 
conditions. Perhaps it also follows that if certain animals are shown by future research to be 
statistically more likely to self-destruct in certain environments, we may have a moral duty 
to change those environments or relocate the animals. If animals, commit suicide while under 
human care, we may have to apply a strict scrutiny standard to those responsible for them.  
 
More generally, it may also follow that all of us should engage in serious self-critique 
and rethink our assumptions about animals (and alter our practices accordingly). For 
example, if some animals engage in suicidal behavior, does this mean they engage in the kind 
of “negation behavior” that anthropologists have historically hailed as the Promethean 
dimension of human life? Does this mean that they, as Fenton (2014) argues using 
chimpanzees as examples, have the ability to say “no” — “no” to other animals, “no” to 
humans, “no” perhaps to life itself? Can animals reflect on, and reject, their conditions of 
existence? Can a chimp, mirroring Socrates, differentiate between a “life” and “life worth 
living”?28 These may sound like just abstract philosophical questions, but they have concrete 
ramifications for researchers, veterinarians, and even ethicists that we cannot ignore. 
Ethically, what might it mean that captivity drives some animals to the edge of self-
annihilation? Similarly, what might it mean that we often use sentient beings that may be 
capable of consent in invasive biomedical research without their consent (whatever that may 
look like)? That’s the thing about philosophical questions — they seem distant, until they hit 
                                                 
27 After observing how a group of chimpanzees at Blair Drummond Safari Park in Scotland dealt with the death 
of a conspecific, Anderson, Gillies, and Lock (2010) concluded that chimpanzees prefer not to die in isolation. 
For chimpanzees, a good death, much like a good life, is one shared in communion with others. As a result, we 
may be ethically obliged to study how chimpanzees normally deal with death in the wild so as to avoid placing 
them in situations where they are unable to cope with it in species-typical ways while in captivity. We may also 
be morally obliged to ensure that, if they die under our care, they do so with dignity. And we may be obliged to 
avoid euthanizing these animals, even if we think this is the compassionate thing to do: “It might be more 
humane to allow elderly apes to die naturally in their familiar social setting than to attempt to separate them 
for treatment or euthanasia” (p. R351). 
28 Hribal (2007) claims animals can, and do, refuse to live under conditions they find deplorable.  






There are sound empirical and philosophical reasons to support the animal suicide 
hypothesis. Some follow from ethological and laboratory research about animal sentience, 
cognition, and behavior: others from what current suicide research practices entail. A 
“paradigm shift” (Kuhn 1970) in suicide research from a mentalistic and anthropocentric to 
a more behaviorist and continuist approach could deepen our understanding of the parallels 
between human and nonhuman animals and help solve various conceptual problems in 
human suicide research. It would also put pressure on suicide researchers to define suicide 
more clearly, and on animal researchers to better justify the grounds on which they postulate 
some “great divide” between humans and animals. If such a divide exists, suicide is not it.  
Although stories about suicidal animals are anecdotal, what matters is that they are 
perfectly plausible from the standpoint of contemporary science (Preti 2011a, p. 819). Thus, 
even if we cannot currently prove that any animal has committed suicide as a matter of fact, 
there is a large and growing body of evidence indicating that this possibility cannot be ruled 
out as a matter of principle. Some creatures, to quote Braitman (2014), “should be given the 














ANHEDONIA: The inability to experience states of pleasure and joy. 
ANTHROPOCENTRIC THEORY OF SUICIDE: The view that only human beings are capable of 
engaging in suicidal behavior and completion.  
CONTINUIST THEORY OF SUICIDE: The view that the suicidal behaviors of human and 
nonhuman animals exist on a natural continuum. 
EPISTEMIC HUMILITY: The virtue of being modest in one’s judgments about the social, 
cognitive, and behavioral capacities of nonhuman animals.  
FREE WILL: A metaphysical force that allows individuals to make choices that are not caused 
or determined by prior natural causes. 
HUMANIST BIAS: An error in interpreting and evaluating information that occurs as a result 
of holding onto the belief that humans are exceptional among, and superior to, the 
animals.  
INTENT: A mental state typically believed to cause the behavior of rational, linguistic agents.  
SENTIENCE: The ability “to experience pleasurable states such as joy, and aversive states such 
as pain and fear” (Helen 2012, p. 628). 
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SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR: Self-directed acts that can endanger the wellbeing of an animal or 
terminate its life-activity.  
SUICIDE: Suicidal behavior that culminates in the death of an animal; see “suicidal behavior.” 
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